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Abstract
The dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge has been shown in a number
of previous studies utilizing the process control task, where participants would learn to control
the system well, but not be able to verbally articulate their knowledge (Berry & Broadbent,
1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan,
1989; Roussel, 1999; Sun & Mathews, 2005). This study attempts to advance this basic research in the area of implicit learning by examining the type of mental knowledge representation acquired in implicitly learned tasks, and also assess the transfer of that knowledge to conceptually similar tasks. Participants controlled a simulated nuclear reactor version of the process
control task by inputting a selected number of fuel pellets to maintain a desired temperature on
several tests over 2 one-hour sessions after receiving either instructions to perform the task
through visual means, memorizing exemplars, receiving hints about how the task operates, or
receiving no instruction. Results show that participants’ performance improves with experiential practice, even after memorizing the best responses on standard tests. Results from transfer
tests (i.e., a novel target level and a different scale than previously practiced) suggest that explicit knowledge is less transferable than the implicit knowledge acquired through practice in
this task. This study did not support that the process control task is normally learned through
visual recognition of patterns of inputs and outputs across trials- however, the results neither
support that the task is normally learned by the storage of exemplars in the form of a look-up
table (Dienes & Fahey, 1995).
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Introduction
Any degree of expertise would depend on both explicit, conceptual knowledge and
implicit, experiential knowledge. However, experts are often only conscious of their explicit
knowledge. This dissociation has been shown in a number of previous studies utilizing the
process control task, where participants would learn to control the system well, but not be able
to verbally articulate their knowledge (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1988;
Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989; Roussel, 1999; Sun &
Mathews, 2005). This lack of awareness of experiential knowledge engenders stringent
challenges for learning and training programs in many different contexts since experts are often
at a loss when trying to convey their knowledge to others. This study will attempt to advance
basic research in the areas of learning and cognition by examining the type of mental
knowledge representation that is acquired in implicitly learned tasks, and also assess the
transfer of that knowledge to conceptually similar tasks.
Learning research is a major part of the foundation of cognitive psychology. Although a
large number of definitions exist for the phenomenon of explicit learning, a common
undercurrent pervades most of them: explicit learning is knowledge that is mastered with
awareness and effort, is accurate, is able to be articulated easily, shows a large amount of
generalization between disparate tasks, is usually slow and uses substantial amounts of the
learner’s cognitive resources, and finally, is consciously available to the learner (Berry &
Dienes, 1993). Although meetings among cognitive psychologists remain placid and amicable
when the term “explicit learning” is brought forth, the term “implicit learning” has not been
greeted with the same atmosphere of comity and consensus that its more provocative relative,
explicit learning, has been greeted with by the scientific community.
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One of the most widely debated theories in the field of cognitive psychology is that of
implicit learning. Although implicit learning has been defined in innumerable ways throughout
the cognitive psychology literature, this is one of the most widely accepted definitions of the
term:
“Implicit learning is the process through which we become sensitive to certain
regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to learn about those
commonalities, (2) in the absence of awareness that one is learning, and (3) in such a
way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express” (Cleeremans, 1997).
It is noteworthy that even amongst ardent supporters of the phenomenon of implicitly
acquired knowledge, the degree of relation between explicit learning and implicit learning is
debated. For example, Lewicki (1986) proposed that although implicit learning and explicit
learning are both real world concepts that can be shown to exist experimentally, explicit
knowledge operates completely independently from implicit knowledge. A second theory of
implicit learning posits that implicit learning is secondary to the primary experience and occurs
independent of any intention to assimilate new material or experiences. Even more interesting
is the fact that this hypothesis puts forth the notion that implicit learning occurs outside of the
subject’s awareness (Cleeremans, 1997). A third hypothesis presented by Mathews, Buss,
Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, and Druhan (1989) argues that implicit and explicit learning
are not independent, but are rather symbiotic: implicit processes occur by recognition of
patterns and the explicit knowledge that this pattern recognition activates in turn affects the
output of the implicit learning mechanisms. This hypothesis is based on the view that implicit
learning is a memory-based mechanism that automatically identifies patterns of family
resemblance among similar experiences (Mathews, et al., 1989). This research study will focus
on testing the hypothesis of pattern recognition as a possible mechanism of implicit learning
using a dynamic process control task as discussed further within.
2

Characteristics of Implicit Knowledge
Although the availability of knowledge is disputed, previous research has shown that
much of what is acquired through implicit learning tasks eventually becomes available to
conscious expression through accumulated practice (Reber, 1989; Mathews, et al., 1989;
Sanderson, 1989). However, what is stored usually exceeds what can be expressed, as indicated
by the progressive performance on implicit learning tasks and participants’ inability to verbalize
rules about how the task behaves without extensive practice (Broadbent, FitzGerald, &
Broadbent, 1986; Mathews, et al., 1989; Sanderson, 1989).
One alleged characteristic of implicit learning is that it shows transfer specificity (Berry
& Dienes, 1993). The knowledge acquired in implicit learning tasks is believed to be less
flexible and more context bound than knowledge that is acquired explicitly. One feature of
implicit learning that displays the notion of transfer specificity is the relative inaccessibility of
knowledge in free recall. Previous studies of implicit learning have shown very low rates of
transfer to explicit recall tests and verbalization of the acquired knowledge (Berry & Broadbent,
1984; Mathews, et al., 1989). Participants in these experiments could not articulate what they
know or answer questions about the tasks. However, although they believed they were merely
guessing, participants’ performance was still above chance. Such evidence suggests that
implicit learning cultivates relatively specific knowledge that cannot be freely recalled.
There is also evidence that implicitly acquired knowledge shows limited transfer to
related tasks (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Berry & Dienes, 1993; Roussel, 1999). Previous
research using implicit learning tasks have shown little or greatly reduced transfer to similar
tasks based on the same underlying structure. Even when participants were informed of the
critical relationship between two structurally related tasks, Berry and Broadbent (1988) found
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that transfer between the tasks was impeded. They suggested that informing the participants of
the relationship between the two tasks before carrying out the second task induced an explicit
mode of learning that had a negative effect on the subsequent performance. A later study by
Berry (1991) showed a lack of transfer between merely watching participants perform a task
and their actual performance when controlling the task themselves. This suggests that for
implicit learning to occur, one must learn by actually doing the task, and not simply through
observation.
Process Control Task
The process control task is a widely used computerized implicit learning task that can
incorporate many different cover stories, although the underlying rules governing its behavior
remains the same. Originally utilized by Berry and Broadbent (1984), the process control task
used in these experiments had participants imagine that they were controlling a factory that
produces sugar. The participants’ goal was to maintain a given target level of sugar production
by varying the number of workers employed at the factory. The range of sugar production and
the participants’ input of workers were over a total of twelve levels (e.g., 1000 through 12000
tons of sugar for production output, and 100-1200 workers employed for participants’ inputs).
Production of sugar in this task is affected by the number of workers in a nonlinear fashion
because of the inclusion of the previous output level of sugar production in the following
formula: P = (2 x W) – P1 + N, where P = the current level of sugar production, W = the
number of workers input by the participant, P1 = the previous level of sugar production, and N
= a random noise element that varies the output by +/- 1000, or one level, at a 33% chance of
variation in either direction.
All versions of the process control task have many qualities which makes it a good
analogue for complex tasks that are learned in the real world. For instance, participants often
4

find the task difficult to learn, and, while participants’ performance improves, their ability to
communicate knowledge about how the task operates occurs rarely and only after extensive
practice (Roussel, 1999). This is similar to expertise for many real-world tasks, such as driving
a car, playing golf, or riding a bicycle, which all involve mastering complex sets of motor skills,
yet people are often at a loss for words when it comes to explaining exactly how they perform
these actions.
The process control task also imitates real-world complex tasks in that it is dynamic,
where the initial existing state of the system is constantly changing. This would be similar to the
constantly changing positions of the players and the ball when playing a game of tennis. In the
process control task, the output is not only dependent on the participant’s input, but also on the
previous output. This, plus the addition of the random noise element makes learning the
underlying rules of the process control task difficult to discover. Previous research using the
process control task has shown that participants rarely discover or state the formula, and are
more likely to fall back on an implicit mode to guide their performance (Mathews, et al., 1989;
Roussel, 1999). This is because of the nonlinear relationship between the participants’ input and
the system’s next output in the process control task (e.g., increasing the number of employees
does not always increase sugar production levels, similarly, using fewer workers does not
always decrease sugar production levels).
A cover story that Berry and Broadbent (1984) utilized for the process control task in
addition to the sugar factory description involved informing participants that they would be
interacting with a computer person named Clegg. Clegg’s behavior and the participants’ inputs
ranged over twelve levels from very rude to loving, corresponding to the number of employees
and sugar production in the other version of the task mentioned previously. The computer
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person interaction task was mathematically equivalent because it utilized the same formula to
control the output levels. Participants were instructed to maintain Clegg’s behavior at the very
friendly level, similar to maintaining a target level of production of sugar (i.e., 6000 tons). This
second cover story was used to test for consistent results between the two versions of the task,
with no differences being found in performance between the two distinct cover stories (Berry &
Broadbent, 1984).
A later study by Sun and Mathews (2005) employed the sugar factory cover story and
another cover story for the process control task, where participants imagined that they were
controlling a simulated nuclear reactor’s temperature by inputting varying amounts of fuel
pellets. Although similar to the sugar factory version of the process control task in all aspects
except the input and output labels and the cover story, the nuclear reactor version was thought
to be a less “rich” domain for generating overly general rules (Sun & Mathews, 2005). In other
words, participants would be more easily able to think of reasons to explain the inconsistent
effect of increasing workers, which can sometimes cause sugar production to increase or
sometimes decrease. For example, a decrement in sugar production following an increase in the
workforce could be contingent on factors such as: worker fatigue, overcrowding or low worker
morale, whereas increased sugar production following a decrease in the number of employees
could be the result of supplanting a less productive work force with a more efficient one or
increasing worker morale. Due to the nuclear reactor task’s more mechanical, abstract nature,
and the lack of obvious relationships between variables (e.g., an increase in the quantity of fuel
pellets input into the system can sometimes decrease the nuclear reactor’s temperature), most
participants would likely encounter a large amount of difficulty arriving at explanations that
make sense to them for counterintuitive events. However, the results of this study showed
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identical patterns of results with both types of cover story (Sun & Mathews, 2005). Thus,
richness of knowledge about a domain does not appear to be an important factor for this task.
One of the properties investigated in previous research using the process control task
was how different types of verbal instruction affected participants’ performance on the task.
Berry and Broadbent (1984) utilized the process control task to examine whether verbal
instruction on how to reach the target level would affect task performance and verbalizable
knowledge. They found that the verbal instructions improved the participants’ performance on
the task (i.e., the ability to control sugar production), except when it was coupled with a
requirement to verbally validate each response. Other types of instruction such as exemplar
memorization, providing a simple heuristic, rule instruction, and providing written transcripts of
participants “thinking aloud” as they performed the task, were also found to be of some benefit
to performance on the process control task (Stanley, et al., 1989).
Another issue, concerning the flexibility of implicitly acquired knowledge, was also
tested in prior studies using the process control task. Some researchers who have investigated
the transfer of implicit knowledge have suggested that it is inflexible and highly specific (Berry
& Dienes, 1993; Dienes & Fahey, 1995). For example, Dienes and Fahey (1995) found that
performance on the process control task was at chance levels when the initial state of the system
was one that had not been experienced before (e.g., the current output level had not been seen
before). Other studies utilizing versions of the process control task have found positive transfer
between performance on two perceptually similar tasks, although no transfer was found across
two perceptually dissimilar tasks, even though the underlying equation governing the tasks was
the same (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Squire & Frambach, 1990). In the case of Berry and
Broadbent (1988), participants also showed no transfer between two conceptually similar tasks
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if they were first informed of the relationship between them. It seems that informing participants
of the central relationship between the two tasks prevented them from transferring the pertinent
information from one task to the other. This discovery suggests that the process control task may
be performed in a more implicit way, in which participants are not consciously aware of the basis
on which they are responding (Berry & Broadbent, 1988).
A subsequent study that also investigated the transfer of implicit knowledge using the
process control task was carried out by Dienes and Fahey (1998), who tested performance for
sugar production levels that were either experienced or not experienced previously. What they
found was that performance on this ‘specific situations’ task was improved for not only the exact
production levels experienced before, but also numerically adjacent output levels (i.e., outputs that
were one level in either direction from the ones experienced previously). However, performance
on this test for situations beyond one level of sugar production different from those formerly
experienced (i.e., nonadjacent) were at chance levels or below, which suggests that transfer of the
knowledge acquired in this task is limited (Dienes and Fahey, 1998).
In another study, Roussel, (1999) had participants attempt to achieve a new target
production level on half of the trials during a final testing phase in an experiment utilizing the
process control task. This assessed the flexibility of implicit knowledge by measuring performance
for old and new target levels separately. As anticipated, performance for old target levels was
significantly greater than for new target levels (Roussel, 1999). Nevertheless, performance for the
new target levels was better than chance, suggesting some transfer of implicit knowledge.
Finding copious transfer effects in previous experiments utilizing the process control
paradigm are particularly rare. However, Sun and Mathews (2005) argued that the restricted
transfer of implicit knowledge found in these experiments was due to the limited exposure to
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training and performing of the task. Real-world learning situations that depend heavily on
implicit knowledge, such as natural language processing, would require extensive practice,
whereas the typical experiments investigating the transfer of implicit knowledge usually
involved performing a task for less than 5 minutes. This quantity of practice may not be
adequate to extend the level of implicit knowledge to that which is necessary to enable the
accurate demonstration of its flexibility (Sun & Mathews, 2005). The alleged inflexible nature
of implicit knowledge has previously been disputed by Mathews, et al. (1989) also, who
suggested that this attribute is due to the way implicit learning has been studied formerly. Prior
studies have searched for “pure” cases of implicit learning, utilizing simple motor tasks (i.e.,
reaction times) where there is no evidence of conscious awareness of what was learned. These
simple motor tasks simply do not lend themselves to the study of generalization and flexibility
of acquired knowledge. In addition, it has been posited that the flexibility of implicit knowledge
is “tuned” to the level of variability of the learning task, with more advanced implicit learning
tasks showing greater transfer (Mathews, et al., 1989).
The effects of different types of reflection on performance in the process control task
were also examined in previous research. The effect of one form of reflection, involving
merely instructing participants to attempt to figure out the rules affecting the behavior of the
task, has been varied. This manipulation was found to decrease the participants’ learning and
performance on the process control task when in a non-salient condition where the relationship
of the input to the output was not easy to predict (e.g., the normal nature of the process control
task). However, the same type of reflection did improve participants’ learning and performance
when in a salient condition where the relationship of the input to the output was easy to
discover (e.g., the output was always two levels lower than the immediately preceding input),
(Berry & Broadbent, 1988).
9

Another type of reflection utilized in conjunction with the process control task was used
by Berry and Broadbent (1984), which required participants to think out loud and to verbally
report their reasoning for input choices as they performed the task. What Berry and Broadbent
found was that this concurrent reflection was not effective in improving learning or
performance on the process control task. These experiments, however, did not incorporate a
proper non-verbalizing control group. A subsequent investigation using two versions of the
process control task done by Stanley and colleagues (1989), found that verbalization caused a
slight positive increase in the level of learning, as measured by participants’ performance on the
tasks.
Roussel, (1999), however, found that reflective practice, which involved having
participants write out and log which rules they were using for each input, interferes with
learning to control sugar production in the process control task. Two possible mechanisms were
proposed by Roussel, (1999) for this interference effect of reflection on performance. The first
was participants’ generation of inaccurate explicit rules about how the task behaves due to
attempted reflection about the task. Roussel (1999) hypothesized that participants would
continue to use the inaccurate rules they generated until they discovered new ones, thus
affecting performance in a negative way. The second possible mechanism posited was that the
negative effect on performance was due to interference with implicit learning processes because
the concurrent reflection acts as a secondary task, using up cognitive resources.
Sun and Mathews (2005) tested Roussel’s two proposed mechanisms for the
interference effect by comparing the nuclear reactor version and the sugar production version of
the process control task. Sun and Mathews (2005) hypothesized that if the main reason for the
negative effect of reflection is due to participants generating inaccurate rules, that the
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interference effect would be stronger in the sugar factory version because of its richer nature for
generating overly general or inaccurate rules as discussed previously, and because the reactor
control scenario is a relatively foreign system that seems mechanical to participants. Sun and
Mathews (2005) therefore hypothesized that if Roussel’s second proposed mechanism,
interference with the implicit learning process, is the more important factor for the interference
effect, that similar levels of reflective interference would be found in both versions of the task.
Although the negative effect of explicit reflective practice was replicated from Roussel’s (1999)
study, the prediction that there would be a larger interference effect occurring in the more
familiar sugar factory version of the task was not supported (Sun and Mathews, 2005). This
suggests that interference with implicit learning processes rather than generating inaccurate
rules seems to be the major cause of the interference effect of reflection.
Another manipulation that was done using the process control task was to expose
participants to others’ ideas about the task, using other participants’ policies (i.e., written
instructions on how to perform the task), experimenter-provided task hints, and allowing
participants the opportunity to discuss their ideas with other learners in the experiment
(Roussel, 1999). Roussel, (1999), found that exposing participants to others’ policies had no
effect, suggesting that learners may ignore ideas not generated by themselves, or that they may
have trouble integrating others’ ideas into their own beliefs about the task.
Providing participants with task hints in the form of a few good examples, such as “If
current reactor temperature is 10,000, then input 800 fuel pellets”, was found to have facilitative
effects on learning in the process control task (Roussel, 1999; Sun and Mathews, 2005).
Participants who received the hints outperformed those who did not in two separate
experiments, done by Roussel, (1999), and Sun and Mathews (2005), respectively. Both found
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that these simple hints had an immense effect on participants’ learning and performance.
Roussel, (1999) suggested that the hints’ effectiveness was more than just a function of
providing specific valid instances for only a few possible circumstances, but rather that it
helped participants by providing a general idea of how to look at the task. Sun and Mathews
(2005) suggest that the hints do not cause participants to perform effective hypothesis testing to
find the formula or search for more good rules because concurrent reflection while attempting
the task, even when given the hints, never enhanced learning. Instead, they proposed that the
hints allowed participants to more quickly perceive the family resemblance among cases by
noticing the pattern of successful and unsuccessful trials and more rapidly find good cases
(Roussel, 1999; Sun and Mathews, 2005). Nonetheless, reflection done in between practice
sessions did enhance performance, and even more so when the participants’ reflection was
focused on recalling specific valid instances of controlling the reactor’s temperature (Sun and
Mathews, 2005).
Other evidence that learners seem to acquire correct responses more from implicit
induction rather than explicit rule generation in the process control task was found by Sun and
Mathews (2005). In one condition in this experiment, participants were given hints about the
form of the equation and given calculators to tests their hypotheses. Despite this, the college
level participants were still exceptionally bad at figuring out the relatively simple equation that
controlled the simulated nuclear reactor’s temperature (Sun and Mathews, 2005). This finding
is in alignment with the hypothesis proposed here, that participants are not discovering and
recalling rules, but rather learn the process control task through pattern recognition by
responding to visual cues and implicitly knowing what to do.
Knowledge Representation
There has been considerable debate over the type of mental representation of knowledge
acquired in implicit learning tasks. One of the key distinctions between the different theoretical
12

frameworks for understanding implicit learning is whether the knowledge acquired is
represented in the form of the storage and retrieval of exemplars (e.g., in a “look-up table”
format) (Broadbent, et al., 1986; Marescaux, Luc, & Karnas, 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995), or
in a more abstract way (Reber, 1989; Sun & Mathews, 2005). One model suggests that only
instances where participants reach their goal are recorded in a list, or “look-up table”, and does
not distinguish the knowledge representation as being either implicit or explicit. Berry and
Broadbent (1988) postulated two different possible modes of learning involved in complex
situations where participants acquired knowledge about the relationships between variables.
One mode is unselective, or implicit, where learners observe all the variables without selection
and attempt to store all of the contingencies between them. This case-based knowledge could be
represented as a look-up table containing not only valid exemplars, but bad instances as well.
An alternative mode of learning that was suggested was a selective or explicit mode in which
only the contingencies between a few key variables are stored. This is likely to result in
knowledge that can become explicit because of the relatively small number of relationships
involved (Berry & Broadbent, 1988). This method of learning can be fast and efficient
providing that the correct variables are selected. However, when a task contains many variables
and the wrong ones are selected, learning would be poor in this mode as compared to the
implicit one. Models suggesting a look-up table where the information is implicit, state that the
stored information combines and gives the learner a sense of familiarity or a judgment about its
classification without necessarily permitting participants to report which exemplars were used
or to use individual exemplars for different tasks (Dienes & Berry, 1993).
Perruchet (1998) has also argued for the fragmentary knowledge of specific events
accounting for the performance on implicit learning tasks, although he posits that the
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knowledge acquired is explicit. This hypothesis puts forth that no active abstraction processes
occurs in implicit learning, but that there is only partial explicit memories of the stimuli
presented. Perruchet (1998) believes that participants in any implicit learning situation will
parse the material into small individual units that do not overlap, and that the size of these units
are determined by one’s capacity limitations. According to this hypothesis, one cannot gain
genuine knowledge of the abstract rules governing a situation through implicit learning
mechanisms alone, regardless of the amount of training (Perruchet, 1998). In other words, the
underlying rules can only be discovered by means of explicit conscious effort.
Knowledge that is acquired in the explicit mode can be considered model-based,
consisting of internalized mental models and other declarative knowledge such as general rules,
rather than memories of past experiences involving the task (Berry & Broadbent, 1988;
Mathews, et al., 1989; Reber, 1989). This explicit knowledge usually would not contain specific
responses to prior experiences (e.g., a look-up table). Instead, some sort of inferential process
would have to be used to decide on a course of action (e.g., applying a general rule). Previous
research however, has shown that there is often a large discrepancy between learners’ mental
models and the way they actually perform a task (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Mathews, et al.,
1989). The actual performance of a task was shown to usually depend more on case-based
knowledge, while participants would typically ignore model-based knowledge, although they
would describe their performance to others using mental models. Thus, what learners do and
say are not always the same.
An underlying assumption about the development of expertise that is consistent with
prior empirical research findings is that conscious and effortful attempts to integrate the two
types of knowledge are necessary for speeding up the learning of complex tasks (Berry &
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Broadbent, 1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Berry & Dienes, 1993; Mathews, et al., 1989).
Getting learners to integrate new model-based knowledge, however, is not easy, as previous
research has demonstrated that once participants have some level of skill, there is a strong
tendency to rely entirely on case-based knowledge to perform a task. Another view of expertise
hypothesizes that deliberate practice is necessary and critical for its development (Ericsson,
Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). When learners engage in effortful and deliberate practice of a
task, they attempt to integrate new mental models with their active mental models and their
actual performance of the task, thus putting new or changed models into action and integrating
them with their case-based knowledge.
Knowledge Representation in the Process Control Task
In the process control task, the system is regulated by a single abstract rule (i.e., the
formula determining the output), however, the structure embedded within this task can be
described as a set of simple associations between the current state of the system and the input
necessary in order to reach the target level (e.g., “If current reactor temperature is 10,000, then
input 800 fuel pellets; If current reactor temperature is 11,000, then input 700 fuel pellets,
etc.”). This set of pair-wise associations for specific instances has been described as a look-up
table (Dienes & Fahey, 1995). Using a look-up table to perform the process control task
consists of recalling and executing the same action in response to a new situation that was
previously successful in earlier trials. In some previous studies utilizing the process control
task, it has been shown that participants abstract no rules, but rather perform the task as
described by the look-up table model (Marescaux, et al., 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995). The one
exception to this that has been found was when the relationship between input and output was
determined by a very simple and salient rule (e.g., the output was always two levels lower than
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the input, with the current state of the system having no effect) (Berry & Broadbent, 1988;
Dienes & Fahey, 1995). In this salient condition only, participants were able to acquire and use
abstract knowledge in the form of general rules about how the system operates.
Although it has been hypothesized that the recall of specific instances in case-based
knowledge is in the form of a look-up table, this recollection of previous experiences does not
have to be explicit. When presented with a particular situation in the process control task (e.g.,
the current output), participants may recognize a similar past experience, either consciously or
unconsciously, in which they made a certain response and were successful in reaching their
target level and simply respond in the same manner again (Stanley, et al., 1989). If participants
are not consciously recalling the previous episodes and their recognition is implicit, they may
only experience a feeling of knowing what to do, and, while they would be able to perform the
task, they would not be able to articulate this knowledge. This is consistent with prior findings
in the implicit learning literature which utilized the process control task to show the dissociation
between performance ability and verbalizable knowledge (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Berry &
Broadbent, 1988; Mathews et al., 1989; Stanley et al., 1989).
In the look-up table hypothesis posited by Dienes and Fahey (1995), the details of the
individual instances in the table can be amalgamated, and therefore the knowledge would
become more abstract, but not necessarily as abstract as the general rules learned in the explicit,
model-based mode (e.g., “respond halfway between current output and the target level”). The
amount of processing done on the stimuli was hypothesized to determine how abstract the
stored knowledge becomes. With the least possible processing, each specific instance would be
stored independently of the others. This simple list of instances could be considered the
“purest” look-up table (Dienes & Fahey, 1995). On the other hand, similar experiences can be
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combined and situations can be defined in progressively more abstract ways, until the look-up
table blends into a more general rule-based model. Overly general rules, such as “start at the
extremes and work towards the middle,” would lie at the abstract, model-based end of a
continuum between the two models.
It has also been hypothesized that implicit learning of the process control task may not
be dependent on recalling specific instances, but rather depend on pattern recognition of family
resemblance among the patterns of responses across trials (Sun & Mathews, 2005). Sun and
Mathews (2005) believe that the process control task is learned more like a skill (e.g., learning
to shoot at a moving target), than by explicit rules (e.g., following a recipe). Although there is
some evidence of learning the process control task by the recall of exemplars, Sun and Mathews
(2005) believe that while the knowledge may be expressed as a look-up table when asked to
verbalize one’s acquired knowledge, that it is ultimately more than that. It is believed that the
mental representation may contain additional information that comes from the implicit
abstraction of family resemblances among correct responses. This is based on the finding that
concurrent reflection while performing the task was found to interfere with learning because it
acts as a secondary task and detracts one from seeing the family resemblances across trials
(Roussel, 1999). Other evidence that the process control task is learned and controlled through
pattern recognition is that even when participants were not given any time to reflect during (i.e.,
they performed a speeded version of the task) or after (i.e., a distracter task was employed)
practice, giving a simple hint (e.g., three valid examples) was just as effective as when
participants were allowed to reflect (Sun & Mathews, 2005). If this effect resulted from figuring
out the rules and filling in a look-up table until all twelve instances were discovered, concurrent
reflection with the hint should have been very helpful. Each correct response could be written
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down until all the possible responses were recorded. Instead, the hint was found to be very
helpful even without the time to reflect. This suggests that participants were not recalling good
instances and reapplying them to control the task since they would not have had the time to do
so in the speeded version, but rather that the hints helped participants to learn how to look at the
pattern of successful and unsuccessful trials while performing the task (Sun & Mathews, 2005).
In other words, the hints may cause participants to focus more on the trial-by-trial changes in
the pattern of the output, and that such a change in attention would enhance the implicit
learning of the task.
Purpose of the Study
Sun and Mathews (2005) suggest that experientially acquired implicit knowledge
is similar to learning through pattern recognition. During implicit learning, tasks are learned
passively and without awareness of what was learned. This is akin to recognizing a friend’s
face, where you are consciously aware and instantly know who the person is, but probably have
little consciousness and are not aware of what cues or features are being used to recognize that
person. Pattern recognition while controlling the process control task would be similar to
playing a computerized ping-pong game, where one responds to where the ball is and moves the
paddle accordingly without thinking about it. Individuals do not form rules while learning to
play computer ping-pong. If the look-up table hypothesis was applied to this, it may postulate
that one mentally segments the screen into a graph containing both horizontal and vertical lines,
and forms rules such as “when the ball is at 30 degrees longitude and 80 degrees latitude, turn
the paddle three quarters of a turn in a counter-clockwise direction”. Surely, most would agree
that no one learns this task in such a ludicrous way. Similarly, in the process control task
participants would respond to visual cues and implicitly know what to input based on the graph,

18

and not form rules for specific instances (i.e., a look-up table). This study will investigate the
effects of different types of mental representations by manipulating instructions and information
provided by having participants control the nuclear reactor version of the process control task
after either memorizing a complete table of all twelve possible instances, receiving hints that
consist of either three valid instances or a general idea of the relationship between the input and
output, being explicitly instructed to perform the task by visually examining the input and
output graphs on the screen, or receiving no instruction on how to perform the task. This study
will also examine the transfer of implicit pattern recognition by testing participants’
performance on a visually similar task (i.e., the scale of the input numbers will be logarithmic),
and, in addition, also examine the transfer of implicit and explicit knowledge by having
participants in all groups attempt to maintain a new target level on another transfer test. This
knowledge will also be assessed by administering a paper and pencil test consisting of visual
screen shots with the numbers removed, and verbal questions consisting of single input/output
scenarios.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
This study will address the following specific questions and investigate the
consequential hypotheses presented below:
Research Question 1: Do individuals normally learn to perform the process control task
through pattern recognition from visual cues or through the employment of a look-up table (i.e.,
recalling and applying specific valid instances)?
Research Question 2: How does the mental representation of the knowledge acquired
while learning the process control task affect the transfer of the knowledge to other related
tasks?
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Hypothesis 1: It is believed that without special instruction, participants will learn to
perform the process control task through visual pattern recognition rather than through the
recall of exemplars. This will be shown through the utilization of a speeded version of the
process control task in which participants will not have the time for the recollection of specific
valid instances, and by giving participants in one condition explicit instructions to control the
task through visual means. It is predicted that the visually instructed group and the group that is
not instructed (i.e., the experiential group), will outperform the group that will memorize the
look-up table of all possible instances on the speeded version of the process control task, but not
on a self-paced version of the task. The table memorization group is expected to perform best
on the self-paced tests since they would easily have enough time to think of and input the
correct responses that they had already memorized. Performance of the groups receiving the
hints should come out in the middle of the other groups, with the performance of the group
receiving the three specific instances falling closer to the table memorization group since the
hint given to them is a partial table, and the performance of the group being given the general
hint landing nearer to the experiential and visually instructed groups since the hint given to
them simply suggests a pattern between the input and output graphs. Furthermore, the visually
instructed group is expected to have the best performance on the speeded test since they will be
given a strategy to control the task that is fast (i.e., pattern recognition).
Hypothesis 2: It is alleged also, that if the mental representation of the knowledge from
this task is acquired through pattern recognition, that participants receiving visual instructions
will show the greatest transfer to a visually similar task with a different scale and on visual
screen shot questions with the input and output numbers removed on a paper and pencil test,
and that the experiential control group will show greater transfer than the group memorizing the
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look-up table on the same tasks, since the new scale will create different rules that were not
studied previously. Transfer is also predicted to be the worst for the table memorization group,
and the best for the visually instructed group, on a transfer test in which participants attempt to
maintain a new target level, which will also result in new rules governing the task that were not
studied. Once more, the performance of the groups receiving hints are expected to fall in
between the other groups on the transfer tests as well.
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Methods
Participants and Design
Participants in this study were undergraduate students enrolled in introductory
psychology courses at Louisiana State University who voluntarily participated in exchange for
extra credit. A total of one hundred thirty four subjects participated in the seven different
conditions (e.g., five conditions with practice: table memorization, visual instruction, general
hint, specific hint, experiential practice, and two control conditions without practice: table
memorization without practice, and an experiential condition that received no instruction and no
practice time) in both sessions. Five students who participated in session one did not show up
for session two, and therefore were not included in any analyses. In addition, some data was lost
as a result of two computers experiencing hard drive failures; therefore the number of
participants for each test is slightly different.
The experiment was arranged as a factorial design that consisted of the following
factors: 1.) Type of practice (table memorization, visual practice, general hint, specific hint, and
experiential practice), and 2.) Type of test (two self-paced tests, a fast-paced test, a paper test,
and transfer tests for a new target level and a different scale).
The principal dependent measure is performance on the tests, as indicated by the
average unsigned deviation from the target production level during the testing phases of the
process control task. Means from the first practice phase (i.e., in session one) were also
obtained in order to show improvement in the transfer of knowledge with practice. In addition,
performance on the paper test was scored by the number of correct responses given by the
participants.
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Tasks
The primary task utilized for this study was the nuclear reactor version of the process
control task, as described earlier in the research conducted by Sun and Mathews (2005). The
nuclear reactor version of this task is exactly the same as the sugar production task used by
Berry and Broadbent (1984) in all aspects except the cover story and the labels for the input and
output of the system. It employed the identical formula, specified previously, to determine its
output. The task is described as a simulated nuclear reactor that participants must control and
maintain the temperature of by inputting fuel pellets (see Appendix A). Thus, the input is
labeled “Fuel Pellets”, and the output is labeled “Reactor Temperature”. The participants’ task
was to maintain the nuclear reactor’s temperature as closely as possible to the target level. On
each trial they had to input a new level for the number of fuel pellets, and the nuclear reactor
output its temperature accordingly. Over the two sessions, each participant completed hundreds
of trials in two practice phases (one per session, except for the no practice conditions) and
several testing phases.
Several manipulations were done with the nuclear reactor version of the process control
task to create different tests in this experiment. Besides the standard self-paced test using this
task, this study also utilized a speeded test in which participants had to input their fuel amounts
very quickly (i.e., within 1.5 seconds), which was meant to block the explicit recall of
exemplars, and also a test with a different target level (i.e., 8000 instead of 6000) to test transfer
of knowledge, and a test in which the input numbers were displayed in their logarithmic values.
The logarithm scale was used for this test in a way that visual patterns in the graphs would
remain the same as the standard version of the task, but the intervals between the numerical
values of the inputs would be radically different, in order to assess visual pattern recognition.
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Other tasks used in this experiment include a paper and pencil test which included
output temperatures given either verbally (see Appendix E) in order to test explicit recall, or in
a screen shot view of the graphs shown on the screen (see Appendix H) to test pattern
recognition. For each output, participants were asked to give the best input of fuel pellets in
order to maintain a 6000 degree temperature in the reactor.
Procedure
Participants were placed randomly in one of the seven conditions: 1.) Table
memorization with practice, 2.) Visual instruction, 3.) General hint, 4.) Specific hint, 5.)
Experiential (i.e., no instruction) with practice, 6.) Table memorization without practice,
transfer test only, and 7.) Experiential without practice, transfer test only. Those assigned to the
table memorization conditions received a table of all twelve possible instances of the reactor’s
temperature and the best inputs to reach the target, and instructions to study and memorize the
table (see Appendix B). Participants in the visual instruction group received instructions to
perform the task by visual means (see Appendix C). The experiential groups did not receive any
instruction beyond the description of the task (see Appendix A). Participants in the two hint
groups received hints about how the task operates. The general hint gives the subject a general
idea of the pattern between the input and the output of the system (see Appendix F), while the
specific hint gives the user a partial table consisting of three specific examples of inputs based
on current output level (see Appendix G). All participants in the conditions, except for those in
the no practice control conditions, completed two 1-hour sessions in which they attempted to
control the nuclear reactor’s temperature in the simulation. The no practice control conditions
simply took only the transfer test to a new target level (e.g., the table memorization without
practice and experiential without practice, transfer test only conditions) in a single session.
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Participants in the table memorization without practice condition memorized the table in the
same manner as the table memorization with practice condition except that the former group did
not get time to practice the task and simply took the transfer test for a new target level (i.e.,
participants were asked to maintain the reactor’s temperature at 8000 in the test after
memorizing the best inputs to maintain a 6000 degree level). The two sessions for the rest of the
participants were spaced 48 hours apart in order to test for retention of the knowledge gained in
the first session.
First Session
In the first session, all participants were notified how the simulated nuclear reactor task
is arranged and performed by being given a general instruction sheet on how to operate the task
(see Appendix A). This informed them that it is their job to discover how to achieve and
maintain a target level of temperature by interacting with the simulation. Furthermore,
participants were told that they were in control of only a single input variable (i.e., the number
of fuel pellets). Therefore, their task was to learn the relationship between the amount of fuel
input into the system and the nuclear reactor’s temperature output.
At the beginning of session one, subjects in both table memorization groups (i.e., with
and without practice) were given a table of all possible instances and the correct corresponding
inputs, and were instructed to study the table for two minutes for a later recall test (see
Appendix B). After the two-minute study period, participants in both table memorization
conditions were given the recall test consisting of all the possible outputs of the nuclear reactor
in two dissimilar orders, which asked for the correct input responses. Participants had to get all
twelve input responses correct in both orders before moving on to practicing the reactor task.
This ensured that they had memorized the table and knew it well.
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Participants in the visual instruction group were told that the best approach for learning
this task is to learn it like a skill (e.g., throwing darts). They were informed that through the trial
and error of trying many different inputs and watching the input and output graphs, they would
eventually know the right responses without having to think about it (see Appendix C).
Participants assigned to either the general or specific hint groups received the general or
specific hints (Appendices F & G), respectively. The experiential condition simply began
performing the task immediately after reading its description (Appendix A), and did not receive
any further instruction.
When participants in the five conditions (i.e., not including the control conditions
without practice) were prepared, they began performing the task with 20 minutes of practice
time using a self-paced version of the simulated nuclear reactor task. In the self-paced task,
participants are given as much time as they want (up to the allotted time for this phase) for each
new trial. A trial consists of a single attempt at inputting fuel pellets into the system. Ten trials
are shown on the screen cumulatively (see Appendix D for a screen shot example), with each
set of ten trials comprising a block. Participants completed as many blocks as they could in this
20 minute practice phase.
After completing the 20 minute practice phase, participants moved on to an un-timed,
self-paced testing phase, consisting of 50 blocks (i.e., 500 trials). They were allowed the
remaining time in the one-hour session to complete this test. Participants in the table
memorization without practice condition simply performed the test for a new target level
immediately after passing the table recall test. The participants in the experiential condition
without practice also just took the transfer test to a new target level (experiential without
practice, transfer test only condition) in session one.
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Second Session
The second session first consisted of five minutes of practice time in which subjects
received their group’s instructions and practiced the self-paced task once more. Following that,
the instructions were taken away and participants were given another un-timed, self-paced test,
consisting of 50 blocks in order to evaluate the retention of the knowledge needed to control the
task from session one. Next, participants were given a fast-paced version of the 50 block test in
which they had to enter their input for each trial within 1.5 seconds (1500 ms). This was done to
block any reflection or recalling of exemplars in order to test implicit pattern recognition as
described previously.
Subsequent tests were given in session two to test for transfer to a visually similar, but
different numerical scale, and to test for transfer to a target level that was not attempted by the
participants up to that time. The transfer test to a new target level was administered first, which
used the pre-existing scale for inputs and outputs with only the target level changed to 8000,
and like the other tests, was also 50 blocks and not timed. Next, the transfer test utilizing the
different scale was given in order to further examine pattern recognition. This test used
logarithms of the existing scale for inputs, so that the ratio of the resulting scale was visually
the same, but the numeric intervals for the inputs were quite dissimilar. The target level
remained in the middle of the scale at 6000. This test was also un-timed and consisted of 50
blocks as well.
In addition, for session two, a paper and pencil test using the original target level of
6000, and consisting of two types of questions, was administered to participants. This was given
directly after the speeded test since the transfer tests may cause subjects to learn new rules (i.e.,
novel inputs are required for a different target level). The first type of questions included on the
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paper test was verbal questions which present the participant with only a single temperature
output, and asks for the corresponding input level to use in that specific instance (see Appendix
E). This part of the test consisted of half of the 12 possible temperature outputs arranged in a
random order. The second type of question that was utilized on the paper test was screen shot
examples of the input and output graphs. These questions displayed what the participants saw
on the screen while performing the task, except that the input and output numbers were
removed to test for “pure” pattern recognition (see Appendix H). The screen shot examples part
of the paper test included the six specific output temperatures that were not tested with the
verbal questions.
At the conclusion of session two for all but the no practice control conditions,
participants were debriefed and given a paper slip worth the extra credit points for their classes
for participating in both sessions of the experiment. Participants in the control conditions
received their credit at the end of the first session since they did not need to return.
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Results and Discussion
Summary of Overall Performance
Figure 1 displays the overall performance of the five practice conditions across all the
tests performed on the computer and the first five blocks of practice during session one.
Improvement with practice is apparent in all conditions, even those who had memorized the
table of the best input responses. Clearly, performance improves with practice, allowing
participants to gain experiential knowledge of the task, regardless of what instructions they are
given.
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Figure1
Overall Performance across First Five Blocks of Practice and Standard and Transfer
Tests in Both Sessions by Condition
Note: Performance is measured by mean deviation from the target level for each test.
No significant differences were found between the two standard tests in session one and
session two (i.e., Test 1 and Test 2 in Figure 1). This demonstrates that participants retained
nearly all of the knowledge they had gained in session one 48 hours later in the performance of
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the test in session two. In addition, some improvement was shown in the experiential-based
practice conditions across sessions, demonstrating greater retention of implicit task knowledge,
whereas the explicit conditions (i.e., the table memorization and specific hint groups) actually
had worse performance in session two’s standard test.
The table memorization group’s unexpected superior performance on the speeded test
may have been due to the amount of time allotted for each input on the speeded test (i.e., 1.5
seconds). This may not have fully blocked the explicit recall of exemplars as it was intended to
do, but the table memorization practice condition’s greater impairment on the speeded test
demonstrates that explicit knowledge can not be used well at this fast pace. The participants in
the table memorization condition that took this test were also allowed practice time with the
task prior to this test, so they may have gained experiential knowledge of the task as well as
being able to recall the exemplars from the memorized table.
The results from the transfer tests show that practice is necessary to learn to control the
process control task well. Simply memorizing exemplars did not lead to transfer to another
target level. These results suggest that explicit knowledge is less transferable than the implicit
knowledge acquired through practice in this task. This is shown by the performance of the table
memorization with practice group, who performed no better than the experiential with practice
group. In addition, all the practice conditions performed similarly, and the conditions that did
not practice (i.e., either after having memorized the table or not) performed equally well,
indicating that no explicit knowledge was transferred to this new task.
Although the table memorization group did perform better on the logarithm scale
transfer test, it could have been due to the participants acquiring additional experiential
knowledge during practice or the flawed nature of the task not fully blocking the application of
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explicit knowledge during this self-paced test. In addition, the general hint’s effect, and not the
specific hint’s on this test, may have been due to the relationship of the inputs and outputs
following a similar pattern to the standard test, and hence the general hint would still be
applicable, whereas the specific hint and the table could not be directly applied to the
logarithmic values (i.e., the specific hint and the table could be indirectly applied through
interpellation).
The results obtained from all the tests will be discussed in further detail using separate
ANOVAs to analyze the data from each test individually. In addition, the number of trials
attempted by each group during the practice phases will also be discussed.
Practice Phases
Analyses were done on the practice phases in both sessions one and two (e.g., 20
minutes of practice in session one, and 5 minutes of practice in session two) to determine
whether there were differences between practice conditions in the number of trials attempted. It
would seem, that since the table memorization condition had the correct inputs memorized, that
the participants in that condition would perform more trials during the practice phases, since
they would simply be inputting numbers without much thought. However, analyses done on the
number of practice trials performed in the allotted time only revealed a significant difference in
session two (i.e., the 5 minute practice phase), F(4, 104) = 3.54, p = .01, with the table
memorization condition and the experiential condition performing significantly more trials than
the general hint group only. The mean number of practice trials, measured in blocks (e.g., each
block equals ten trials), for each condition, along with their corresponding standard deviations,
is given in Table 1.
The poor performance means from the first 5 blocks of practice in session one, shown in
Table 2, demonstrate participants’ improvement with additional practice. An ANOVA done on
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Number of Blocks
Performed in Each Session During Practice Phases
__________Session__________
Condition______________1_______________2_______________n_
General Hint

51.33 (17.69)

17.29 (3.04)

24

Specific Hint

52.64 (15.54)

20.38 (6.57)

21

Visual Instruction

53.05 (17.10)

20.48 (6.52)

21

Experiential

56.52 (11.90)

22.29 (6.40)

21

Table Memorization 58.73 (15.08)

23.14 (5.68)

22

________________________________________________________
the practice data from the first 5 blocks indicated a significant effect of condition, F(4, 108) =
17.07, p < .001, with the group that memorized the table of best responses performing the best
right away, as was expected. However, the group that had memorized the table still performed
much more poorly during these first 5 blocks relative to their later performance, indicating that
they had learned more than just the table during practice. Experiential knowledge was
obviously gained through practice in all the conditions that included practice time (e.g.,
compare the means of the first 5 blocks of practice and performance on the first test in session
one for the five practice conditions). This demonstrates that practice does lead to better
performance of this task, even when not given any specific instructions, since the experiential
with practice condition’s performance also significantly improved.
Session 1 – Session 2
A repeated-measures ANOVA was done on the equivalent self-paced tests in session
one and session two in order to demonstrate participants’ improvement in controlling the
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level (6000)
on First Five Blocks of Practice in Session One by Condition
Condition_____________First 5 Blocks of Practice_______n__
General Hint

3262.50 (681.87)

24

Specific Hint

3001.09 (956.82)

21

Visual Instruction

3377.14 (467.39)

21

Experiential

3315.83 (416.69)

21

Table Memorization

1882.73 (890.81)

22

___________________________________________________
nuclear reactor’s temperature in the first test in session two. The main purpose of this analysis
was to examine the participants’ knowledge that was acquired from the different practice
conditions. Another purpose of this analysis was to examine the retention of the participants’
knowledge that was acquired from session one until session two, which was 48 hours later. This
analysis included session (i.e., the self-paced tests from session one and two) as the withinsubjects factor, and condition (identified by type of practice) as the between-subjects variable.
The average unsigned deviation from the target production level, which was 6000 in these tests,
is given for each condition along with its corresponding standard deviation, in Table 3. Results
from the ANOVA revealed no significant differences in performance across sessions on the
self-paced tests, F(1, 102) = 1.97, ns, indicating that participants did not significantly improve
their performance in session two. However, some improvement was shown in the practice
conditions that were thought to rely on memory-based performance (i.e., the visual,
experiential, and general hint conditions), demonstrating some retention of implicit task
knowledge. Although improvement across sessions was not significant, this analysis did show a
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main effect of condition, F(4, 102) = 22.04, p < .001, with the table memorization group
demonstrating the best performance as was predicted for these tests.
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level (6000)
on Self-Paced Tests as a Function of Condition and Session
__________Session__________
Condition______________________1__________________2___________n__
General Hint

2363.67 (809.61)

2087.67 (899.72)

24

Specific Hint

2057.40 (845.21)

2197.60 (859.46)

20

Visual Instruction

2892.67 (745.44)

2789.71 (780.71)

21

Experiential

2453.70 (818.71)

2132.50 (886.99)

20

959.82 (254.09)

1023.73 (500.94)

22

Table Memorization

________________________________________________________________
Post hoc tests of comparisons confirmed that participants in the table memorization
group performed significantly better than those in all of the other conditions. In addition,
significant differences between the visual instruction condition and all the other groups, except
the experiential group, were found. However, the performance of the visually instructed group
was inferior to the performance of participants in the other conditions, which was not expected
since the visual instructions were thought to help. Although the visual instructions do not
appear to facilitate performance, they apparently do not significantly impair it since the
difference in performance between the visually instructed group and the experiential group,
which received no instruction, was not significant. There were no other significant effects or
interactions found in this analysis.
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Test 2 – Speed Test
The next analysis that was done examined differences in performance between the selfpaced test and the speeded test in session two, since these two tests were completed sequentially
and were the same except for the time restriction (1500 ms) in the speeded test. A repeatedmeasures ANOVA was computed with test (self-paced vs. speeded) as the within-subjects
factor and practice condition as the between-subjects factor. This allowed not only differences
between the groups on each test to be examined, but differences within each group between
each of the tests to be looked at as well. Mean deviations from the target level, which was also
6000 in both of these tests, along with standard deviations, are given for each condition in
Table 4.
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level (6000)
on Self-Paced Test and Speeded Test (1500 ms) in Session Two by Condition
__________Test__________
Condition__________________Self-Paced___________Speeded________n__
General Hint

2087.67 (899.72)

2520.75 (619.40)

24

Specific Hint

2162.53 (868.18)

2352.84 (627.32)

19

Visual Instruction

2789.71 (780.71)

2950.38 (592.34)

21

Experiential

2167.52 (879.36)

2524.29 (876.90)

21

Table Memorization

1023.73 (500.94)

2022.27 (727.95)

22

_______________________________________________________________
The analysis of within-subjects contrasts revealed significant differences between the
tests, F(1, 102) = 41.82, p < .001, and a test by group interaction, F(4, 102) = 5.28, p = .001,
with performance being poorer on the speeded test in all conditions, as expected. However,
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participants in the table memorization practice condition were hypothesized to do the worst on
the speeded test, which is clearly not the case. The between-subjects examination by condition
showed significant differences between the conditions, F(4, 102) = 11.22, p < .001, with the
table memorization group performing the best on both tests.
While the time allotted for each input on the speeded test may not have fully blocked
explicit recall of exemplars, the table memorization practice condition’s greater impairment on
the speeded test demonstrates that explicit knowledge can not be used well at this fast pace. The
table memorization group’s performance on the speeded test did show the most impairment out
of all the practice conditions, with the mean deviation from the target almost doubling on the
speeded test as compared to the self-paced test that immediately preceded it (e.g., 1023.73 on
the self-paced test in session two vs. 2022.27 on the speeded test).
Post hoc tests verified that the table memorization group performed significantly better
on both tests than all the other practice conditions. This was not anticipated since it was
thought that the participants in the table memorization practice condition would not have
sufficient time to recall the exemplars that they had memorized previously while performing the
speeded test. Furthermore, participants’ performance in the visual instruction condition, which
was expected to be superior, was found to be significantly worse than both the hint groups, but
not the experiential group. Again, this shows that although they did not help as expected, the
visual instructions did not hurt performance significantly.
Transfer Tests
New Target Level Test
Performance on the transfer test to a new target level was analyzed with a one-way
ANOVA by condition in order to demonstrate transfer of any knowledge previously learned and
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differences in the amount of generalizable knowledge learned by each group. The mean
deviation from the target level, which was 8000 for this test, is given for each condition along
with its corresponding standard deviation, in Table 5. Results from this analysis displayed a
main effect of condition, F(6, 159) = 6.77, p < .001. Post hoc tests revealed that the experiential
without practice condition performed significantly worse than all the other conditions except for
the table memorization without practice condition, which performed significantly worse than
the remaining conditions except for the visually instructed group. The table memorization and
experiential with practice
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level (8000)
on New Target Level Test by Condition
Condition_________________________New Target Level Test_________n__
General Hint

2198.94 (991.53)

24

Specific Hint

2238.61 (937.39)

21

Visual Instruction

2573.79 (955.73)

21

Experiential with Practice

2074.64 (774.53)

23

Experiential without Practice

3191.07 (931.81)

30

Table Memorization with Practice

2155.27 (705.53)

22

Table Memorization without Practice

2850.45 (835.92)

25

________________________________________________________________
conditions performed significantly better than the two corresponding conditions without
practice and the visually instructed group.
It was expected that participants who practiced the task and were instructed to use visual
means to control the task, those that were not instructed (i.e., the experiential group), and, to a
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smaller degree, participants that received the general hint about how the task operates, would
show greater transfer of generalizable knowledge than participants in practice conditions that
were thought to induce model-based learning (i.e., the table memorization group, and to a lesser
extent, the specific hint group). One reason for the lack of finding significant differences
between the groups that practiced the task in this analysis could have been because all of the
participants in the five conditions that practiced the task completed an equivalent amount of
practice time (i.e., 20 minutes in session one, and 5 minutes in session two) in which they could
also acquire implicit task knowledge in addition to any explicit knowledge they were given or
had learned, regardless of which practice condition they were in (i.e., the participants in the
table memorization with practice condition would gain the same amount of experiential task
knowledge as the other practice conditions). This is why the two control conditions that were
not allowed any practice time (i.e., the table memorization without practice and experiential
without practice conditions), and therefore not exposed to the task prior to the test, were also
included. This finding suggests that a similar amount of generalizable knowledge was learned
by all participants who practiced the task, regardless of which practice condition they were in.
The results from this test show that practice is necessary to learn to control the system
well, and that simply memorizing exemplars for one target level does not lead to transfer to
another target level. These results also suggest that explicit knowledge is less transferable than
the implicit knowledge acquired in the process control task. This can be demonstrated by the
performance of the table memorization with practice group, who had acquired the greatest
amount of explicit task knowledge and performed no better than the experiential with practice
group, who had obtained mostly implicit knowledge of the task during practice. Since all the
practice conditions performed similarly, and the conditions that did not practice performed so
poorly, this indicates that no explicit knowledge was transferred to this new task.
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Logarithm Test
A one-way ANOVA by practice condition was performed on the logarithm test to
further assess pattern recognition in the participants. The target level for this test was 6000,
making it visually comparable to the self-paced tests in all aspects except for the logarithmic
input values. The ANOVA displayed a significant effect of practice condition, F(4, 101) = 2.64,
p < .05, with the table memorization group performing considerably better than participants in
the visual instruction condition. The means and standard deviations for each condition’s test
performance are presented in Table 6.
A post hoc test of comparisons revealed that the table memorization group’s
performance was significantly improved over the performance of participants in the visually
instructed group. No other significant differences between groups were found. This result was
the opposite of the outcome that was predicted since it was thought that participants would have
to rely on visual pattern recognition to perform this test. A possible reason for this is because
the logarithmic values of the inputs were displayed on the screen in descending order in the
identical manner of the inputs on the other tests. Since this was a self-paced test, sufficient time
was available to permit participants to simply count which of the twelve “levels” each of the
logarithmic inputs was displayed at, and thus mentally translate them back into their prelogarithmic values (e.g., if the current output was 9000, the participant could count the
logarithmic inputs and choose the seventh one from the bottom which represents 700, the
correct input response). Assuming that this is what participants did for this test, and that this test
was not completely successful in blocking the use of explicit knowledge, the table would be
applicable, hence the group memorizing the table’s superior performance.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level
on Logarithm Test by Condition
Condition_________________Logarithm Test___________n__
General Hint

2137.83 (727.99)

23

Specific Hint

2443.18 (886.13)

17

Visual Instruction

2719.16 (692.32)

19

Experiential

2379.90 (926.20)

21

Table Memorization

1948.34 (859.59)

22

____________________________________________________
Paper Test
Screen Shot Scenarios
This part of the paper test investigated the transfer of implicit knowledge of patterns by
utilizing screen shot examples of six of the twelve possible output temperatures with the input
and output numbers removed (see Appendix H). This was done so that participants would have
to rely purely on pattern recognition to answer the questions. It was hypothesized that the
visually instructed group and the experiential group’s performance would be superior on this
portion of the paper test. However, results from post hoc tests show that participants in the table
memorization practice condition performed significantly better than all other groups on these
questions, and therefore a significant difference between groups was found, F(4, 98) = 23.66, p
< .001. This is possibly because of the participants’ experiential knowledge that was gained
during practice, or possibly because knowledge of the table could have been applied since
participants could have counted the lines on the edges of the graphs to figure out what
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numerical values they represented. Means and standard deviations for this part of the paper test
are displayed in Table 7 along with the means and standard deviations for the verbal portion of
the test.
Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) for Paper Test in
Session Two by Condition and Type of Question
__________Type of Question__________
Condition_________________Verbal_____Screen Shot___n__
General Hint

1.82 (2.04)

1.59 (1.26)

22

Specific Hint

2.63 (1.92)

1.95 (1.78)

19

Visual Instruction

0.81 (1.25)

1.14 (1.10)

21

Experiential

2.00 (1.80)

1.55 (1.26)

22

Table Memorization

5.71 (0.72)

4.71 (1.38)

21

___________________________________________________
Note: Scores are out of 6 possible correct answers.
Verbal Questions
Single output scenarios that asked for the corresponding input values were used for this
section of the paper test in order to examine participants’ model-based knowledge to see
whether they had learned specific rules on how to control the reactor (i.e., “If current reactor
temperature is 10,000, then input 800 fuel pellets; If current reactor temperature is 11,000, then
input 700 fuel pellets, etc.”). Analysis on the verbal part of the paper test revealed a significant
effect of practice condition, F(4, 98) = 25.59, p < .001, with participants in the group that
memorized the table performing the best, as expected.
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Post hoc tests verified that the table memorization group did significantly better,
recalling more exemplars than participants in all other practice conditions. Furthermore,
participants in the visually instructed group performed significantly worse than all other
practice conditions. This finding was anticipated since it was hypothesized that visually
instructed participants would have the least amount of explicit knowledge, and the participants
that had memorized the table of correct responses would have had the greatest amount. This
result also supports the hypothesis that generating a table is not what usually occurs when
people learn this task since the table memorization group had more knowledge of the correct
input/output pairs than the experiential group. Means and standard deviations for the paper test
are presented in Table 7.
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General Discussion
While the results from this study do not appear to lend support to the first hypothesis
proposed here- that the process control task is normally learned through visual recognition of
patterns of inputs and outputs across trials- the results neither support that the task is normally
learned by the storage of exemplars in the form of a look-up table. Although it was predicted
that participants in the visually instructed practice condition would perform the best on the
speeded test and the transfer tests, the visual instruction group performed the worst on all the
tests. The unexpected poor performance of the visually instructed group may have been due to
the passive nature of the instructions (i.e., telling participants to just watch the graphs and
perform by trial and error). This result sheds new light on what is needed to learn the process
control task. Clearly, just watching the results of trial and error responses while performing the
task is inadequate. Other research (Roussel, 1999; Sun & Mathews, 2005) has shown that
careful internal reflection while performing the task is not beneficial either. There seems to be
something in between, perhaps just reinforcement learning. This would involve simply being
engaged with the task (i.e., actively trying to control the nuclear reactor’s temperature) and
evaluating responses that work best with respect to the goal.
It does not appear that heuristic strategies (Fum & Stocco, 2003) are necessary either,
because participants in the table memorization practice condition would not have needed to
actively employ any strategies while performing the process control task. Yet this group
appeared to acquire the same level of implicit experiential knowledge as the other practice
conditions, as evidenced by their performance on the transfer tests.
The table memorization group performed much better on the standard tests than the
experiential or hint groups, which suggests that natural learning of this task is different.
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Acquiring good implicit knowledge of the task through active practice seems to be the key to
flexible knowledge, rather than learning the best responses, as evidenced by the no practice
control condition’s poor performance on the new target test. The table memorization practice
condition also demonstrated the greatest impairment on the speeded version of the task, further
advocating that this may not be the best way to learn flexible knowledge.
Although they showed the most impairment, the unsurpassed performance of
participants in the table memorization practice condition on the speeded test could be explained
by the possibility that the rate of entry (1.5 seconds) may have been too slow to completely
block model-based use (i.e., the retrieval of exemplars). If this were the case, the speeded test
would have been only partially successful in eliminating the use of their explicit knowledge.
Sufficient time during the speeded test would only be needed to recall the previously
memorized instances, not for learners to discover rules and build mental models. The amount of
time allotted to participants for each input response in this test (1.5 seconds) was probably
enough to easily recall and input one correct value on most of the trials. However, all groups
did show considerable impairment on the speeded test, so, obviously, the speeded test was fast
enough for participants not to be able to use their explicit task knowledge well.
The facilitative effects of experimenter-provided task hints can also be seen in this
study, with the groups receiving either the general or specific hints performing significantly
better than the visual and experiential groups on the standard tests. The group that memorized
the table, which can be considered an ‘all-inclusive hint’, and also practiced the task, performed
the best out of all of the groups on all of the tests using the process control task, except for the
transfer test to a new target level. Although the speeded test may have only been a partially
successful attempt to stop the use of a look-up table, the new target transfer test did apparently
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remove all value of the look-up table, reducing the performance in the table memorization
practice condition to the same level as the other groups that also were allowed to practice the
task prior to the test. The performance of the table memorization without practice condition’s
performance on this test was even worse than the visually instructed group’s performance. This
suggests that participants in all of the practice conditions acquired a comparable amount of
implicit experiential knowledge, and that any explicit knowledge acquired by the participants
was not transferred. This is consistent with prior research that demonstrated that the hints’
efficacy is due more to facilitating memory-based processes rather than serving as a cue to build
a mental model of the task (Sun & Mathews, 2005).
Hypothesis two posited that participants in the more memory-based practice conditions
would demonstrate the greatest transfer of knowledge to other perceptually similar tasks (i.e.,
the transfer tasks), however, this was not what was found. Although all of the practice
conditions were found to acquire a similar amount of generalizable knowledge in the transfer
test to a new target level, this was possibly because all of the groups completed an equivalent
amount of practice time in which they could acquire implicit task knowledge, regardless of
what type of explicit instruction they were given. Given that memorizing and using the table for
one target level should not help transfer to a new target level because the table values would be
wrong, participants in the table memorization condition were apparently learning more than just
the table by developing good implicit knowledge of the task as well. Further support for
acquiring experiential task knowledge through practice regardless of instruction is found in the
results of the control conditions in which participants either memorized the table or received no
instruction, but were not allowed to practice the task. The performance in these conditions was
considerably worse than all the other conditions that were allowed to practice the task,
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suggesting that participants were developing good implicit knowledge of the task through
practice.
The logarithm test also examined the transfer of implicit pattern recognition in the
process control task; however, the table memorization group unexpectedly outperformed the
visually instructed group on this task. Again, the possibility that the participants memorizing the
table also learned additional implicit task knowledge during practice phases could be
considered a reason for this outcome. Another possibility is that the explicit knowledge of the
participants in the table memorization group was flexible and did transfer to this task.
Further evidence for the transfer of explicit table knowledge is found in the table
group’s performance on the paper test. The results from the verbal portion of the paper test
document that participants in the table memorization practice condition did acquire the most
explicit knowledge of the correct pair-wise associations used to control the task. This lends
further support to the hypothesis that generating and using a table is not what usually occurs
when people learn this type of task since the experiential group, who were not instructed, did
not demonstrate such knowledge. Although it was predicted that participants that had
memorized the table would show the greatest amount of explicit knowledge on the verbal
questions on the paper test, the table group also unexpectedly did well on the screen-shot
questions on the paper test, which were meant to assess pattern recognition. These results
demonstrate the flexibility of learned explicit knowledge of the process control task.
Although many of the findings from this study were not what were anticipated, the
results do suggest that both implicit, memory-based knowledge, and explicit, model-based
knowledge play a role in learning the process control task, and possibly other implicit learning
tasks. The process control task is not a ‘pure’ task. Since there are no purely implicitly learned
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tasks, developing expertise would always depend on both types of knowledge in nearly all
learning situations. The data suggest that explicit table knowledge of the process control task
seems to be flexible as well as implicit experiential knowledge acquired through practice.
However, the results obtained from this study do suggest that the transfer of experiential-based
knowledge is greater than explicit model-based knowledge in this task. Further research to
definitely conclude what the precise nature of the mental representation acquired in the process
control task is, and how it affects transfer to conceptually similar tasks, is needed.
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Appendix A
Simulated Nuclear Reactor Control Instructions
In this study, we are examining artificial nuclear reaction control. We have written a
program that imitates the response patterns of a nuclear reactor. We are studying the reactor’s
responses to fuel input. You will play a computer game in which you attempt to control the
reactor’s pressure by giving it fuel. The reactor’s pressure is represented by numerical scale
ranging from 1000-12000. We have found that the nuclear reactor is most efficient when it is
directly in the middle of the pressure scale, at a level of 6000.
The nuclear reactor will take the number you input (amount of fuel), and will give you an
output number (nuclear pressure). You will use the numbers 100-1200 and the reactor will
output the numbers 1000-12000. The goal of the game is to keep the reactor’s pressure at 6000,
which is the medium pressure level.
There are two graphs on the screen. On each graph, the horizontal axis indicates for
which trial you have just given fuel. The graph on the left represents how much fuel you have
put into the reactor. The graph on the right indicates the reactor’s pressure for each trial. By
looking at the vertical axis on the left hand graph, you can see the amount of fuel you inputted
for trial number 1; and then you can look at the right hand graph and see what the reactor’s
change in pressure was for trial number 1. There is a horizontal line drawn at the 6000 point on
the right hand graph. This is to remind you where the middle pressure level is and to keep the
reactor’s pressure at this level.
Each block of the game consists of ten trials. That is, you will have ten opportunities to
input fuel. At the end of each block, click ‘OK’ on the screen that pops up to begin the next
block. You will do 20 minutes of practice and then you will be tested for 50 blocks on keeping
the reactor’s pressure at 6000.
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Appendix B
Instructions for Table Memorization Group
You were given a table of correct input responses for every possible output temperature of the
nuclear reactor (below). You will have 2 minutes to study and memorize it, and then you will be
tested to be sure you know it well. After that you will use your knowledge of the table to
control the simulated nuclear reactor in the game.
The following is a table of the exact behavior of the nuclear reactor. Following this will keep
the temperature near 6000:

If Output Temperature is:

Then Input Fuel:

1,000

300

2,000

400

3,000

500

4,000

500

5,000

500

6,000

600

7,000

700

8,000

700

9,000

700

10,000

800

11,000

900

12,000

900
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Appendix C
Visual Learning Instructions
The best way to learn to control the output in this task is by doing lots of trials and watching
what happens. It’s a lot like learning a skill such as dart throwing. Just keep your eyes on the
graph and see what happens as you change input values. Watch the resulting changes in the
output graph. After lots of trials you will eventually become good at keeping the output near
target level.
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Appendix D
Screen Shot of Process Control Task
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Appendix E
Verbal Input/Output Questions for Paper Test

If the current output is 12,000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? _________

If the current output is 4000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? __________

If the current output is 10,000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? _________

If the current output is 8000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? __________

If the current output is 2000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? __________

If the current output is 6000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? __________
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Appendix F
General Hint Group Instructions
The number of fuel pellets should always follow the temperature of the reactor. That is, when
the temperature is high, you need a lot of fuel, and when temperature is low you need little fuel.
Similarly, when the temperature is near the middle, you should use a moderate amount of fuel,
not high or low.
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Appendix G
Specific Hint Group Instructions
Examples of good rules:
If reactor’s temperature is 1000, then input 300.
If reactor’s temperature is 4000, then input 500.
If reactor’s temperature is 7000, then input 700.
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Appendix H
Screen Shot Example Question from Paper Test

What number of fuel pellets should be entered next? _____________
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